Gregory Friedman The Greg Wide Web on the name →

Essay · history · ethics

Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Was Annihilation Justified?

The Second World War ended with a bang, two in fact. After the United States dropped “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan surrendered. American opinion at the time was not close to divided: a Gallup poll taken shortly after the bombings found that 85 percent of Americans approved of using atomic weapons on Japanese cities. By 2005 the figure had fallen to 57 percent. That drift is the first clue that something in the justification was never as settled as the original consensus made it look.

Both the motives for dropping the bombs and the consequences of doing so remain disputed, and the dispute is not merely about facts. It is about which frame the facts belong in. Three frames have done most of the work. From a humanitarian standpoint, the bombings inflicted immense civilian suffering. From a utilitarian standpoint, they were justified because they minimized net casualties on both sides against the alternative of invading the Japanese mainland. From a political standpoint, they were aimed less at Japan than at the Soviet Union. My argument is that the third frame is the strongest, and that the second was largely built afterward to defend a decision made for the reasons named in the third.

Take the humanitarian frame first. The bombings killed roughly 200,000 civilians. Survivors watched their communities destroyed and their families incinerated. Sachiko Matsuo, who was eleven at the time and survived the Nagasaki blast in a bunker, described going back toward the family home:

After a while, we became worried about our house, so I walked to a place from where I would be able to see the house, but there was a [big cloud] covering the whole city, and the cloud was growing and climbing up towards us … I could see nothing below. My grandmother started to cry, “Everybody is dead. This is the end of the world.”

Alongside the loss of family and neighborhood came the specific horror of what the survivors saw. Yoshiro Yamawaki, searching Nagasaki for his father, recalled corpses in the streets whose “skin would come peeling off just like that of an over-ripe peach, exposing the white fat underneath.”

Whatever surprise the United States government expressed publicly, it understood what it had done. The Strategic Bombing Survey, in a report held in Truman’s secretary’s files, recorded that the “primary reaction to the bomb was fear, uncontrolled terror, strengthened by the sheer horror of the destruction and suffering witnessed and experienced by the survivors,” and noted that the effect “came not only from the surprise and their crushing power, but also from the feeling of security among the inhabitants of the two cities before the attacks.”

That last clause deserves attention. Security before the attack is not incidental to the suffering; it is part of the mechanism. The report is describing terror as an effect the weapon produced efficiently, which is a strange thing to record about a purely military measure.

The humanitarian frame has one methodological virtue that the other two lack. Its advocates were not, on the whole, pursuing political or economic advantage. They were making a claim about justice that runs across national lines, and they wanted the victims’ testimony to count as evidence rather than as color. That does not make the frame decisive on its own. Suffering establishes the cost of an act, not its wrongness, since defenders of the bombings never denied the cost. It does establish what any justification has to be large enough to outweigh.

The standard defense answers exactly that. Yes, the suffering was enormous, and it was still the lesser evil, because the alternative was worse.

The alternative was real. Both American planners and the Japanese army were preparing for a full-scale amphibious invasion of the home islands, Kyushu first and then Honshu, under the plan called Operation Downfall. Casualty projections for it varied wildly, and the highest of them ran to somewhere between one and four million American casualties and as many as ten million Japanese. On a strictly utilitarian view, where the moral act is the one that minimizes total suffering, preventing that invasion could justify the bombs.

Those numbers deserve more scepticism than they usually get, and this is where the original version of this argument was too credulous. The high estimates come from wartime and postwar planning documents produced by an institution with an interest in the answer, and other contemporaneous estimates were far lower. A range spanning a factor of four is not a calculation; it is a bracket wide enough to accommodate whatever conclusion is wanted. Any utilitarian argument is only as good as the quantity it rests on, and this quantity was never stable.

It also matters who was doing the arguing. The utilitarian case is the principal moral defense of the American government’s decision, which gives the government, and the military in particular, an incentive to promote it and to treat the other frames as sentimental. The pattern is visible in the sources. Ed Barrett, writing for the United States Naval Academy’s ethics program, holds that “Japan 1945 was one of those very rare and tragic situations in which a necessary and lesser evil justification permits the intentional killing of innocents.” He may be right. He is also not a neutral party, and the institutional provenance of an argument is relevant evidence about why that argument is available and well funded rather than about whether it is true.

Against the official account, many historians have argued that the primary goal was to posture against an expanding Soviet Union rather than to achieve a military result in Japan.

The Truman administration’s preoccupation with Soviet intentions is documented, and it is strongly worded. A National Security Council assessment in the secretary’s files describes the USSR as “ever driven to new conquests, internal and external,” “irrevocably identified with an increasing struggle for world revolution,” and marked by a “peculiarly dangerous” aggression whose danger lies in “its persistence, intensity and scope.”

One caveat has to be entered here, and the earlier version of this essay did not enter it. That document dates from 1950, five years after the bombings. It is good evidence about the administration’s settled cold-war outlook and only suggestive about the state of mind in August 1945. Used carefully it shows the direction of travel. Used carelessly it smuggles the Cold War backward into a decision that preceded it.

The stronger evidence is contemporaneous and diplomatic. Mark Selden’s analysis of American and Japanese documents concludes that “impressing Russia was more important than ending the war in Japan,” and that a principal aim was to deter further Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe. Gar Alperovitz presses the point about sequence, which is the part that does the real work:

It was only with the entry of the [USSR] into the war two days after the bombing of Hiroshima that the Japanese finally moved to surrender. Japan was used to losing cities to American bombing; what their military leaders feared most was the destruction of the country’s military by an all-out Red Army assault.

If that reading of the timeline is right, the utilitarian defense loses its foundation. The claim was never simply that the bombs ended the war. It was that only the bombs could have ended it without an invasion. Soviet entry supplies a competing sufficient cause arriving at almost the same moment, which is precisely the situation in which a single-cause story should not be asserted confidently.

Two honest qualifications. First, this remains contested; it is a strong reading of the evidence and not a settled verdict, and serious historians continue to defend the traditional account. Second, if deterring the Soviets was the aim, it failed. The bombings accelerated the Soviet nuclear program rather than restraining Soviet ambition, which is worth noting because a political justification that did not achieve its political object has very little left to stand on.

Set the three frames against each other and the shape of the thing becomes clear. The humanitarian frame establishes the size of the cost. The utilitarian frame is the only one that could outweigh that cost, and it rests on casualty figures too unstable to carry the weight and on a counterfactual that Soviet entry undermines. The political frame explains the decision without needing the counterfactual at all.

The reasonable conclusion is not that the utilitarian argument was a lie. It is that it was mostly a rationalization: available afterward, useful afterward, and not the reason. That distinction was not merely academic. From the Vietnam era onward the political reading became important to a counterculture that used it to argue the government had historically preferred strategic advantage to human life, and the argument was serviceable for that purpose because it was substantially correct.

So the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not clear the bar its defenders set for it. The justification that would have made it defensible is the one the evidence supports least well, and the motive the evidence supports best is one that cannot justify killing two hundred thousand civilians. That is a narrower conclusion than “unjustified” in the abstract, and it is the one the sources will actually bear.

Sources

  • Alperovitz, Gar. “The War Was Won Before Hiroshima, and the Generals Who Dropped the Bomb Knew It.” The Nation, August 6, 2015.
  • Barrett, Ed. “Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Justified?” United States Naval Academy, February 14, 2021.
  • Edwards, Rob. “Hiroshima Bomb May Have Carried Hidden Agenda.” New Scientist, July 21, 2005. [Selden quoted here.]
  • Kaiser, David. “Why the United States Dropped Atomic Bombs in 1945.” Time, May 25, 2016.
  • Solly, Meilan. “Nine Harrowing Eyewitness Accounts of the Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Smithsonian Magazine, August 5, 2020. [Matsuo and Yamawaki testimony.]
  • Stokes, Bruce. “70 Years After Hiroshima, Opinions Have Shifted on Use of Atomic Bomb.” Pew Research Center, August 4, 2015.
  • Trueman, C. N. “Operation Downfall.” History Learning Site, May 19, 2015.
  • “U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” June 19, 1946. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives.
  • “Soviet Intentions and Capabilities.” February 20, 1950. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives.

This began as a research paper I wrote in 2021, at sixteen. The thesis survived the rewrite; several of its supporting moves did not. The invasion plan is Operation Downfall, not Overlord; the casualty projections are a contested bracket rather than a figure; the 1950 Soviet assessment cannot speak directly to 1945; and “historians now agree” was doing work that the evidence does not support. Leaving those corrections visible seemed better than quietly fixing them.

Keys on this page

A figure's keys are its own: they answer once the figure has focus, so tab to it or click it first. Esc closes this sheet.